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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, Senior District Judge: 
 
We are asked to interpret what may at worst be labeled 
an ambiguous provision of an insurance policy, to 
determine whether the policy provided coverage for a third 
party, not the insured itself. Upon review we find that 
whatever might be said as to the literal meaning of the 
disputed provision, the practical construction given to its 
terms by the actual parties to the policy--the insurer and 
the insured--resolved any arguable ambiguity and excluded 
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coverage for the third party. We therefore reverse the order 
of the District Court to the contrary. 
 
Background 
 
Zurich-American Insurance Company of Illinois ("Zurich") 
appeals an adverse decision in an insurance coverage 
declaratory judgment action instituted against it by Lesville 
James ("James") as assignee of the rights of Meridian 
Engineering Inc. ("Meridian") and Companion Assurance 
Company ("Companion"). This action arose out of a dispute 
between Zurich and Companion as to their respective 
responsibilities for damages suffered by James, as 
determined in a personal injury action that he hadfiled 
against Meridian. Although it is uncontested that Meridian 
had procured its own liability insurance policy from 
Companion, what is at issue in the present litigation is 
whether Zurich was a coinsurer. 
 
Companion had earlier claimed (and now James claims) 
that Meridian was insured under a policy issued by Zurich 
to Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. ("Hess Oil" or "HOVIC")1 
covering a construction project ("FCCU Project") at the Hess 
Oil refinery in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. That Zurich policy 
became effective on December 1, 1990 and continued for 
the duration of the project.2 As part of the FCCU Project, 
Hess Oil contracted with Meridian to pave some roads. 
While working under Meridian's supervision on August 31, 
1993, James suffered an injury that he asserted resulted in 
a below-the-knee amputation of his right leg. On June 24, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Amerada Hess Corporation ("Amerada Hess") is Hess Oil's parent 
company. Because Hess Oil did not have its own insurance department, 
Amerada Hess was involved in procuring the Zurich policy on Hess Oil's 
behalf. To that end Amerada Hess utilized the assistance of the Marsh 
& McClennan ("Marsh") brokerage firm. 
 
2. Although the policy states that the estimated time for the project's 
completion was 44 months, Zurich Br. 43 states that"the parties to the 
contract have been consistently administering the claims under the 
Zurich policy for nine years. . . ." 
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1994 James filed his personal injury action against 
Meridian.3 
 
Upon learning of James' lawsuit, "Meridian looked for 
insurance policies that might cover its liability for James' 
claim. Meridian identified Companion and Zurich as 
potential co-insurers. . . ." (James v. Zurich-American Ins. 
Co. of Ill., No. 95-117F, slip op. at 4 (D.V.I. Sept. 9, 1998)).4 
Defense of the case was tendered to Zurich as well as 
Companion, but Zurich denied coverage on the predicate 
that Meridian was not insured under its policy. Companion 
proceeded to defend the action, but it also tendered defense 
of the claim to Zurich after initial discovery. Zurich again 
denied coverage, and Companion then brought this 
declaratory judgment action. 
 
James, Companion and Meridian later began settlement 
discussions. Zurich was afforded the opportunity to 
participate in those talks, but it declined. Those 
discussions led to an agreement under which Meridian 
stipulated to a $1 million judgment and assigned whatever 
rights it had against Zurich and Companion to James in 
exchange for James' promise not to execute the judgment 
against Meridian. For its part, Companion agreed to pay 
James $125,000 as a discharge payment for its share of the 
stipulated judgment, and it too assigned its rights against 
Zurich to James. Because Companion's policy limit was $1 
million and Zurich's was $2 million, James stipulated that 
Zurich's maximum liability would be two-thirds of the $1 
million stipulated judgment.5 James was then substituted 
as the sole plaintiff in the federal action. Hence the nature 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Hess Oil and United Dominion Constructors, Inc. ("United Dominion") 
were originally named as codefendants, but they were later voluntarily 
dismissed from the case. 
 
4. Both James and Zurich seem to dispute the District Court's just- 
quoted statement, instead identifying Companion as having discovered 
that Meridian might be covered under the Zurich policy. 
 
5. Each of the Zurich and Companion policies contains a coinsurance 
provision stating that if another policy covers the same claim, the two 
policies are to be treated as coinsurance policies, with each insurer 
responsible for a pro-rata share of coverage based upon the respective 
policy limits. 
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of the relief sought in the declaratory judgment action 
before the District Court was a declaration that Zurich was 
a coinsurer, so that James could collect $666,666 from it 
under the settlement agreement. 
 
On the litigants' cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the District Court determined (in its June 23, 1998 slip 
opinion, the "Summary Judgment Opinion"6) that the 
contract provision identifying the entities covered under the 
policy ("the Named Insured provision") was ambiguous, so 
that the need for extrinsic evidence precluded a decision as 
a matter of law. Here is the Named Insured provision 
(emphasis added): 
 
       Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corps. (HOVIC), Amerada Hess 
       Corporation and its directly and indirectly owned 
       subsidiary companies and/or interests in associated 
       and/or affiliated companies and/or organizations and 
       any other companies or entities over which Amerada 
       Hess Corporation is responsible to insure and/or 
       required to insure under contract or otherwise in respect 
       of their involvement in the HOVIC FCCU Project, and 
       Litwin Engineers and Contractors, Inc. and/or 
       Contractors, Subcontractors and Employees and/or 
       Consulting Engineers; and suppliers as required. 
 
At the ensuing bench trial Zurich stressed that the"as 
required" language at the end of the provision refers back 
to the entities that Hess Oil is "responsible to insure" or is 
"required to insure under contract." In contrast, James 
argued that the provision provided coverage for all 
contractors and subcontractors performing work on the 
FCCU Project because the "as required" phrase relates only 
to "suppliers." 
 Both sides produced extrinsic evidence to support their 
respective interpretations of the provision. Zurich and Hess 
Oil representatives testified7 that the intent of the Named 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. To distinguish between that opinion and the District Court's opinion 
rendered later at the trial, the latter slip opinion (which has earlier 
been 
quoted from in the text at n.4) will be referred to as "Trial Op." 
 
7. All of the testimonial evidence for the bench trial was proffered 
through submissions of the witnesses' depositions and affidavits, not 
through live testimony. 
 
                                5 
 
 
Insured provision was to provide coverage only for"FCCU 
contractors," a term referring to contractors and 
subcontractors that Hess Oil had contractually promised to 
insure. As Hess Oil's Property and Casualty Claims 
Administrator John Talarico ("Talarico") explained, an 
"FCCU contractor is a term of art we use to describe those 
whom HOVIC had agreed to provide insurance coverage as 
embodied by the Zurich Wrap Up policy." 
 
Witnesses from Zurich, Hess Oil and Amerada Hess 
uniformly stated that the Named Insured provision was 
intended to provide coverage solely for FCCU contractors. 
As Talarico explained in a letter to Zurich: 
 
       We purchased the Wrap Up liability insurance first, 
       then the contract provisions were drafted to reflect the 
       coverage terms and limits. The intent is to provide 
       [general liability] and auto coverage for all FCCU 
       contractors in all instances. 
 
Among those bolstering that view were Andrew Wade 
("Wade"), the Zurich underwriter who negotiated the policy, 
James Foley and Ed Weinman, the present and former 
Hess Oil controllers who dealt extensively with Hess Oil's 
various contractors, and Kevin Beebe, Amerada Hess' 
Manager of Corporate Insurance.8 
 
Zurich and Hess Oil employees also testified that the 
policy was administered in accordance with the 
understanding that the provision covered only FCCU 
contractors. Talarico stated that in administering claims 
under the policy Zurich and Hess Oil acted consistently 
with that understanding. Jackie Ward ("Ward"), a former 
litigation claims specialist with Zurich, assumed 
responsibility for handling claims under the policy in 1993 
--well after the policy had become effective but before 
James was injured. Ward said that she was told at that 
time "[t]hat HOVIC or [Amerada] Hess would designate 
those contractors they wanted to insure, and that I was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. For example, Wade testified that the policy covered only FCCU 
contractors and that "FCCU contractors are those that . . . HOVIC is 
obligated to insure because . . . HOVIC offered them insurance as part 
of their contract . . . for the project." 
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then to insure them under the policy with all of the terms 
of it." She further answered "no" to the question whether 
"the word `FCCU contractor' is a word of art used in the 
policy,"9 but she then went on to confirm that "[i]t's a term 
that John Talarico and I used to simplify our dealings with 
each other." Finally, it is undisputed that when James filed 
suit Zurich did undertake the defense of another company 
--a codefendant in James' action--that was an"FCCU 
contractor" that Zurich was contractually obligated to 
insure. 
 
On the other side of the dispute as to original intent, 
some written extrinsic evidence submitted by James 
appeared to indicate that the Zurich policy as written 
provided coverage for all contractors and subcontractors 
who worked on the FCCU project. First, during negotiations 
for the policy Amerada Hess sent Zurich's proposal to 
Marsh and attached Exhibit II(a) as a summarization of the 
policy's terms. Exhibit II(a) listed substantially the same 
language that ultimately appeared in the Named Insured 
provision and went on with this skeletal description of that 
provision: 
 
       Policy names as requested Amerada Hess, HOVIC, 
       Litwin and any other contractor or subcontractor. 
 
Another abbreviated summary of the Zurich policy prepared 
by Wade stated that coverage extended to "Hess Oil Virgin 
Islands Corporation (HOVIC) and all Contractors and Sub- 
Contractors for FCCU Project." Finally, though this added 
factor is at best a slim reed, the policy premium was 
calculated on the total cost of the FCCU Project (which thus 
included the amounts payable on all of the subcontracts, 
including Meridian's). 
 
Because it found that extrinsic evidence in support of 
Meridian's contention more credible and relevant to the 
original contractual intent, the District Court held"that the 
intent of the parties in negotiating the contract was to 
provide coverage for all contractors and subcontractors who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 9. That question is inherently misleading. When the term "FCCU 
contractor" as such does not appear in the policy at all, what sensible 
meaning can be given to the question whether it is a"word of art" there? 
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worked on the FCCU Project" (Trial Op. 13). Alternatively, 
despite its earlier summary judgment ruling, the court 
reached the same conclusion as a matter of law because it 
determined that the ambiguous Named Insured provision 
should automatically be construed against the insurer (id. 
12-13). 
 
Hence, after having determined that Zurich was bound 
by the James-Meridian-Companion settlement agreement,10 
the District Court held that Zurich was a coinsurer of 
Meridian and ordered it to pay James $666,666 plus 
interest. This appeal then ensued. James also cross- 
appeals, arguing that the District Court erred infinding 
that the policy language was ambiguous. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although we have on several occasions upheld (as a matter of 
applicable state law) the validity of two-tiered settlements where they 
are 
 
reasonable and entered into in good faith (see, e.g., Trustees of the 
Univ. 
 
of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1987) and Greater N.Y. 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1088 (3d Cir. 1996)), from 
the very outset we have been "not unmindful of the dangers presented 
by two-tiered settlements" (Lexington, 815 F.2d at 902), particularly 
"that 
 
two-tiered settlements are fraught with the danger of self-dealing and 
should be scrutinized with extra care" (id .). In this instance James' 
covenant not to execute the $1 million consent judgment against 
Meridian left the latter totally indifferent to whether the price tag 
attached to that judgment was really $1 million or (say) twice or three 
times that amount. During the pendency of this declaratory judgment 
action, Companion wrote Zurich that James' action could be settled in 
the range of $300,000, a demand that was apparently then lowered to 
$250,000. Even on the predicate that Companion (which indisputably 
was obligated to cover Meridian, and hence the James claim, under its 
own $1 million policy) would come up with just $125,000 in cash as its 
contribution, that $250,000 figure would have capped out Zurich's 
liability at $125,000 if it had caved in to the demand that it join in a 
global settlement. Instead the $1 million figure that was nominally 
attached to the consent judgment ("nominally" because it meant nothing 
to either Meridian or Companion) placed Zurich at risk for $666,666 as 
the price for having taken this case to trial and now to appeal. This 
scenario appears to provide a classic instance of the concerns that we 
voiced in Lexington. But our disposition of this appeal on other grounds 
makes it unnecessary for us to issue a definitive ruling, rather than 
merely this caveat, on that score. 
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Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Jurisdiction in the District Court was invoked on 
diversity-of-citizenship grounds under 28 U.S.C.S1332. 
Appellate jurisdiction over the District Court'sfinal 
judgment exists under 28 U.S.C. S1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review as to the correct construction 
and legal operation of an insurance policy (see New Castle 
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 
1270 (3d Cir. 1994); Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. 
Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 1997)). Finally, 
the District Court found (Trial Op. 10-11), and neither 
party disputes, that Virgin Islands contract law applies to 
this case. As such, we both (1) apply Virgin Islands contract 
law and (2) exercise de novo review over the District Court's 
interpretation of that law (see Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 983 (3d Cir. 
1996)). In doing so we credit the District Court's factual 
findings. 
 
Whom Does Zurich's Policy Cover? 
 
As stated earlier, Zurich insists that the Named Insured 
provision covers only "FCCU Contractors," a term that does 
not encompass Meridian. Even more importantly, that 
reading is supported by the uncontradicted testimony of 
persons on both sides of the contract itself, as well as the 
consistent post-contracting course of dealings between 
Zurich and Hess Oil. But relying on the ambiguities of 
language and some extrinsic evidence, James asserts that 
Meridian is included as a named insured under the policy. 
Thus the situation is that both parties to the contract say 
that the provision means "X," while a stranger to the 
contract--Meridian--says it means "Y." 
 
We agree with the District Court that the Named Insured 
provision is ambiguous.11 But any extended (or even brief) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. As we have stated, James disputes that in its cross-appeal. But the 
issue turns out to be irrelevant to the outcome. As the ensuing 
discussion reveals, even if the provision were not ambiguous the parties 
to the contract were free to modify its terms, either by express 
amendment or by their conduct. 
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colloquy on how the extrinsic evidence should be weighed 
is entirely unnecessary, because the consistent practical 
construction given to that provision by the parties to the 
contract controls its terms. As the second of its alternative 
rulings, the District Court held that Meridian was covered 
under the policy because extrinsic evidence indicated "that 
the intent of the parties in negotiating the contract was to 
provide coverage for all contractors and subcontractors who 
worked on the FCCU project" (Trial Op. 13, emphasis 
added). So the District Court cast its searchlight of analysis 
solely on the presumed intention of the parties at the time 
of contract formation, not at all on how the contracting 
parties then proceeded to construe the policy in operation.12 
 
But as Capitol Bus Co. v. Blue Bird Coach Lines, Inc., 478 
F.2d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 1973) exemplifies, a basic rule of 
contract construction is that "[a] contract must be 
interpreted in light of the meaning which the parties have 
accorded to it as evidenced by their conduct in its 
performance."13 All of the ALI Restatements of the Law (thus 
including the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
("Restatement")) have been adopted as definitive sources of 
rules of decision by the Virgin Islands Legislature. 14 And 
Restatement S201(1) echoes the teachings of Capitol Bus: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. For example, the District Court did not credit the testimony of Hess 
Oil's current and former controllers because "none of these individuals 
had been involved in the negotiation of the policy, and most if not all of 
them had not even seen the policy" (Trial Op. 8). Similarly, Talarico's 
testimony was discredited in part because "Talarico did not even work 
for Hess at the time the policy was negotiated" (id.) In stark contrast, 
the 
extrinsic evidence produced by James was given greater weight because 
it was generated during the policy's negotiation (id. 6-8). 
 
13. See also such cases as Insurance Corp. of Am. v. Dillon, Hardamon & 
Cohen, 725 F.Supp. 1461, 1464 (N.D. Ind. 1988), adopting the view that 
"where, as here, the insurer and the insureds agree on the interpretation 
of a particular provision . . ., their agreement ends the inquiry," and 
Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 576, 590, 30 N.E.2d 
66, 
73 (1940) ("Where the terms of an agreement are in any respect 
ambiguous and the parties have by their own acts placed a reasonable 
construction upon them, their interpretation will be adopted by the 
court"). 
 
14. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, S4 (1999) states: 
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        Where the parties have attached the same meaning to 
       a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is 
       interpreted in accordance with that meaning. 
 
That same message is conveyed throughout the 
Restatement, as in Restatement S202(5)(emphasis added): 
 
       Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of 
       the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted 
       as consistent with each other and with any relevant 
       course of performance, course of dealing, or usage or 
       trade. 
 
Restatement S202, comm. g adds: 
 
       The parties to an agreement know best what they 
       meant, and their action under it is often the strongest 
       evidence of their meaning. But such "practical 
       construction" is not conclusive of meaning. Conduct 
       must be weighed in the light of the terms of the 
       agreement and their possible meanings. Where it is 
       unreasonable to interpret the contract in accordance 
       with the course of performance, the conduct of the 
       parties may be evidence of an agreed modification or of 
       a waiver by one party. 
 
Zurich's and Hess Oil's post-contracting conduct, as 
manifested by their consistent administration of the Zurich 
policy, was eminently reasonable in practical terms, 
whether adopted as a sensible way to resolve the ambiguity 
of the Named Insured provision's opaque language (framed 
as it was in a way that would fail English Grammar and 
Syntax 101), or even if adopted as a sensible course of 
dealing instead of what might have been perceived as an 
awkward literal meaning of the provision. Either way, the 
contracting parties' uniform course of dealing made it clear 
that they viewed the policy as covering only contractors and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of 
       the law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent 
       not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United 
       States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin 
       Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws 
to 
       the contrary. 
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subcontractors that Hess Oil had a contractual obligation 
to insure. 
 
Indeed, as the District Court itself noted in its ruling on 
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment 
(Summary Judgment Op. 8): 
 
       The affidavits, depositions and other documentation 
       submitted by Zurich show that the individuals that 
       have administered the insurance policy [at Zurich, 
       Amerada Hess and Hess Oil] all agree that Meridian 
       would not be covered according to the way that the 
       Zurich policy has been administered. 
 
That acknowledgment should really have spelled the end of 
the matter. After all, the parties to a contract are free to 
define and clarify--or even to change--the contract's terms, 
and Zurich and Hess Oil did precisely that by pursuing a 
course of conduct consistent with their mutual 
understanding of the Named Insured provision.15 
 
Most importantly for the present appeal, suppose that the 
District Court were right in its parsing of the original paper 
record as indicating that Zurich and Hess Oil had originally 
intended to provide coverage for all subcontractors, thus 
including Meridian. Even so, their later practical 
application of the Named Insured provision in a totally 
different fashion must prevail, because Meridian never had 
any vested rights in the terms of the policy as originally 
written. It is really irrelevant what the extrinsic evidence of 
the original contract negotiations may have shown, because 
Zurich and Hess Oil remained free to modify the contract's 
terms. Restatement S311(2) explains that in the absence of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Citing an opinion from the same District Court in Coakley Bay 
Condominium Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 770 F.Supp. 1046, 1050 
(D.V.I. 1991), the district judge said "[t]he interpretation of a contract 
is 
dependant upon the meaning of the language used by the parties to the 
contract, and the Court must assume that the parties embodied their 
whole intentions in the contract" (Trial Op. 11). That statement ignores 
the dictates of the Restatement, approved and adopted as it has been by 
the Virgin Islands legislature. As such, the District Court's single-
minded 
 
focus on the perceived intentions of the parties as assertedly embodied 
in the language of the contract closed off all inquiry into the 
controlling 
 
relevance of the policy's post-contractual administration. 
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an explicit provision to the contrary, "the promisor and 
promisee retain power to discharge or modify the duty [to 
an intended beneficiary] by subsequent agreement." Here 
there was certainly no explicit provision in the Zurich policy 
to negate that retained power. 
 
At most Meridian (and hence James as its assignee) 
could lay claim to benefits under the policy as an intended 
third-party beneficiary. And on that score, Restatement 
S311(3) lists three vesting events that signal when a 
contract may no longer be modified without the consent of 
an intended beneficiary: 
 
       Such a power [the one referred to in the preceding 
       paragraph's quotation from Restatement S311(2)] 
       terminates when the beneficiary, before he receives 
       notification of the discharge or modification, materially 
       changes his position in justifiable reliance on the 
       promise or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at 
       the request of the promisor or promisee. 
 
Without question, no potential third-party rights that 
Meridian may assertedly have claimed under the contract 
ever vested under any of those alternatives. 
 
First, the record establishes without contradiction that 
Meridian never materially changed its position in reliance 
on the Zurich policy. It will be remembered that Meridian 
purchased its own liability insurance from Companion-- 
indeed, it was not even aware of any possible coverage 
under the Zurich policy until after James had already filed 
suit against Meridian.16 
 
Second, Meridian was confronted with Zurich's totally 
different (and adverse) view of the policy's coverage before 
James (standing in Meridian's shoes via assignment)filed 
the present declaratory judgment action. James' initial 
action against Meridian cannot of course be considered a 
suit on the contract under Restatement S311(3): It was a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. At best, as the District Court found (Trial Op. 4), it was only after 
James' suit was filed that "Meridian looked for insurance policies that 
might cover its liability." At worst, as discussed in n. 4, Meridian never 
even knew about any possible coverage under the Zurich policy until 
Companion had taken over the James personal injury case. 
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personal injury action, not a suit on the contract, and 
neither Companion nor Zurich was named as a party in 
that case. Finally, it is also beyond dispute that neither 
Zurich nor Hess Oil ever requested Meridian's assent to any 
promise that it would be covered under the policy (a 
promise that was never conveyed to Meridian at all). 
 In sum, it is clear that the earliest time at which 
Meridian could even arguably have claimed any type of 
"interest" was the date on which James was injured and 
Meridian's liability for that injury arose. Before that date 
Zurich and Hess Oil were free to modify the policy's terms 
if and to the extent that they desired. And the 
uncontroverted record evidence is that even if there had 
been any intent, as read into the original policy terms, to 
cover subcontractors such as Meridian, that presumed 
intent was supplanted by the mutual understanding-- 
arrived at well before James' injury--that the policy covered 
only "FCCU contractors." And the identical result follows if 
the contracting parties' course of conduct were to be viewed 
as a clarification of ambiguous language. As Federal Ins. 
Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 691 N.Y.S.2d 508, 513 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1999) has put it: 
 
       Moreover, where, as here, the parties themselves 
       agreed to clarify the policy 
 
       . . . their agreement will be enforced even if the rights 
       of a third party are affected, unless the third party can 
       show that it changed its position in reliance upon the 
       agreement as originally written. 
 
Any way you slice it, then, the undisputed conduct of the 
parties controls the terms of the contract between them, 
thus excluding coverage for Meridian. 
 
Zurich and Hess Oil's in-practice application of the policy 
likewise torpedoes the District Court's alternative ruling. 
Having found that the policy was ambiguous, the District 
Court said that extrinsic evidence need not be consulted 
because Virgin Islands law mandates that "the 
interpretation more favorable to coverage must prevail" 
(Trial Op. 12). On that premise, the District Court 
summarily ruled that the policy should be construed to 
include coverage for Meridian, and hence in James' favor. 
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But such generalized doctrines of contract interpretation 
must not be applied in a vacuum. Contra proferentem 
construction of an ambiguous insurance policy against an 
insurer may well come into play where the contract dispute 
is between the insurer and its insured, each contending for 
a different reading of the insured's coverage under a policy. 
But here we are called on to decide a very different 
question: whether a third-party entity is entitled to policy 
coverage where the contracting parties have agreed on a 
negative answer but that third party objects. 
 
Such cases in our Circuit as Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 641 F.Supp. 297, 
307-08 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff 'd without published op. 833 
F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1987), and Hodgins v. American Mut. 
Liability Ins. Co., 261 F.Supp. 129, 130-31 (E.D.Pa. 1966) 
have properly made that very distinction, rejecting the 
application of contra proferentem principles in such a 
context. Here too there is no "doubt as to what the parties 
themselves intended" (the language in Hodgins , id. at 130).17 
Hence the District Court was clearly mistaken in applying 
the doctrine to Zurich's disadvantage in the matrix of this 
case. 
 
It is thus unnecessary to decide the mooted question 
whether Virgin Islands law will construe ambiguous policy 
language against the insurer when the parties to the policy 
have equal bargaining power. But it is worth observing that 
the very existence of that exception in many jurisdictions 
emphasizes that the doctrine itself is to be employed only in 
disputes between parties to an insurance policy, for it is 
fundamental that the purpose of judicial interpretation of a 
contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Where 
both parties have equal bargaining power, any judicial 
concerns about "take it or leave it" contracts of adhesion 
are lessened, and mutual agreement is more readily 
assumed. Here the parties to the contract have agreed on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Indeed, James Br. 30 concedes that a policy provision is strictly 
construed against the insurer only when it is capable of two reasonable 
interpretations--again a proposition based on the differences in 
interpretation between an insurer and its insured. Here both parties to 
the policy agree on its interpretation, so the principle is inapplicable. 
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its terms, and it would subvert freedom of contract 
principles to benefit a third party by employing a legal 
doctrine--useful merely as an aid to interpretation--that 
yields a contrary result. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We apply the Named Insured provision, just as the 
contracting parties have in their own practical construction 
of that provision, in Zurich's favor regarding the exclusion 
of coverage for Meridian. Even if the policy as originally 
drafted were to be construed in Meridian's (and hence 
James') favor, Meridian's (and hence James') rights as a 
third-party beneficiary would not have vested before Zurich 
and Hess Oil had established a consistent course of 
conduct in administering the policy that excluded coverage 
for any subcontractor such as Meridian. Because it is 
undisputed that Meridian was not a "FCCU contractor," we 
hold that the Zurich policy did not provide coverage for 
Meridian as the time of the incident that resulted in James' 
injuries.18 We AFFIRM as to the District Court's 
determination that the policy provision at issue is 
ambiguous (though, as stated earlier, that makes no 
difference in the result), and we REVERSE and order the 
entry of final judgment in favor of Zurich and against 
James. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Counsel for James submitted a post-argument letter, obviously 
stimulated by questions from our panel during oral argument, raising 
the objection that Zurich had not advanced the precise legal position 
that we have articulated here. But both before the District Court and on 
appeal Zurich has urged that the case should be controlled by the 
undisputed evidence demonstrating the uniform post-contract 
understanding of the parties to the policy. We see no principled 
jurisprudential reason for ignoring the first-year law school contracts 
teaching that confirms the correctness of that position. 
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